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Corbin Provost, Alexander Sigler, and Kenneth J. Faller II, Department of Computer Engineering, California State University - Fullerton, 800 N State College Blvd, Fullerton, CA 92831
Side-channel attacks are a critical vulnerability in many systems. Power signatures for electronic devices may obtain information about the current tasks of the system, including cryptographic hashing. Using an invasive side-channel attack to obtain power measurements, spectral analysis and correlation can be performed to measure the similarity between power signatures. Similar to cracking password hashes with a rainbow table, this method allows the user to correlate a new power signature with a precompiled table filled with power traces – each trace associated with a common password. Using a combination of correlation, periodogram difference, and magnitude-squared coherence, similarities in power signatures reveal critical information about the encrypted password, including the original password.
Presenters: Corbin Provost, Alexander Sigler
Institution: California State University - Fullerton
Type: Oral
Subject: Computer Science
Status: Approved
