Spectral Analysis and Correlation of Power Signatures for SHA-256 Encryption Keys

Corbin Provost, Alexander Sigler, and Kenneth J. Faller II, Department of Computer Engineering, California State University - Fullerton, 800 N State College Blvd, Fullerton, CA 92831

Side-channel attacks are a critical vulnerability in many systems. Power signatures for electronic devices may obtain information about the current tasks of the system, including cryptographic hashing. Using an invasive side-channel attack to obtain power measurements, spectral analysis and correlation can be performed to measure the similarity between power signatures. Similar to cracking password hashes with a rainbow table, this method allows the user to correlate a new power signature with a precompiled table filled with power traces – each trace associated with a common password. Using a combination of correlation, periodogram difference, and magnitude-squared coherence, similarities in power signatures reveal critical information about the encrypted password, including the original password.

Additional Abstract Information

Presenters: Corbin Provost, Alexander Sigler

Institution: California State University - Fullerton

Type: Oral

Subject: Computer Science

Status: Approved

Time and Location

Session: Oral 1
Date/Time: Mon 1:30pm-2:30pm
Session Number: 112
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